Monday, August 28, 2017

Monday the 28th

Maritime Monday for August 28th, 2017: Iron Bastard

August 27, 2017 by Monkey Fist

Verdon-sur-mer, Aquitaine, France – photo by jean marc losey (original 3839 x 2510)

Portland Tugboat LLC – Back to School! (TS State of Maine; training ship Maine Maritime Academy; former USNS Tanner T-AGS-40)
Built for the United States Navy as a fast oceanographic research vessel by Bethlehem Steel Corporation at its Sparrows Point Yard in Maryland in 1990. The vessel was the second oceanographic research ship to bear the name of Zera Luther Tanner, a noted oceanographer and inventor of a patented sounding machine. The vessel experienced catastrophic engine failure in 1993 and was laid up by the Navy and eventually transferred ownership to the Maritime Administration.

1955 Belfast on Retronaut – The cargo ship Foylebank under construction at the Harland & Wolff shipyard. The ship was later renamed Patroclos. Image: Bert Hardy/Picture Post/Hulton Archive/Getty Images (Big Ta to Simon Egleton)

The red flag is hoisted aboard HMS Achilles at the Nore, 1797. This dramatic print is taken from Geoff Hunt’s original painting for the cover of ‘Mutiny’, Julian Stockwin’s fourth novel in the ‘Kydd’ series.
In the Middle Ages, ships in combat flew a long red streamer, called the Baucans, to signify a fight to the death. By the 17th century, the Baucans had evolved into a red flag, or “flag of defiance.” It was raised in cities and castles under siege to indicate that they would not surrender. “The red flag is a signal of defiance and battle,” according to Chambers Cyclopedia (1727–41).
British sailors mutinied near the mouth of the River Thames in 1797 and hoisted a red flag on several ships. +

Britain’s First General Mutiny on the BBC

World Update: This past Friday, Dan Damon (broadcasting from the Southampton Docks) looked back to 1797 when sailors anchored in ships at Spithead and the Nore mutinied over inhumane working conditions for seamen in 18th century England. The mutinies happened in the wake of the American and French revolutions, triggered the first of several outbreaks of maritime radicalism in the Atlantic World, and the development of working class consciousness among sailors. Listen / download

Video: The Spithead & Nore Mutiny 1797 on You Tube

Richard Parker, President of the Delegates in the late Mutiny in his Majesty’s Fleet at the Nore For which he suffered Death on board the HMS Sandwich (1759); 30th June 1797. Engraving. Harrison and Co. 8 July 1797
Richard Parker (16 April 1767 – 30 June 1797) was an English sailor executed for his role as president of the so-called “Floating Republic”, a naval mutiny in the Royal Navy which took place at the Nore between 12 May and 16 June 1797

Commanders Engaged at Sea – William Bligh (of 1789’s HMS Bounty infamy) was one of the captains whose crews mutinied over “issues of pay and involuntary service”

HMS Clyde arriving at Sheerness after the Nore mutiny, 30 May 1797 – she was one of only two ships whose captains were able to maintain some control over their vessels during the Nore mutiny.

The traditional five bells rung in the last dog watch ceased on Royal Navy vessels after the affair at Nore, as that had been the signal to begin the mutiny. source

‘Environmental Nightmare’ After Thousands Of Atlantic Salmon Escape Fish Farm

Commercial fishing boats are scrambling to catch as many Atlantic salmon as they can after a net pen broke near Washington’s Cypress Island. Fishers reported thousands of the non-native fish jumping in the water or washing ashore.
A fish farm’s net pen failed Saturday afternoon when an anchor pulled loose. The pen, in the state’s northwestern San Juan Islands, contained about 305,000 Atlantic salmon. keep reading

Washington responds to salmon spill; Cooke brushes off threat to wild stocks

Somali piracy was a big threat to seafarers before 2011, but that threat has diminished in recent years. Dan Damon spoke to Jamal Osman, a freelance Somali journalist who knows pirates better than most. Photo: A Somali pirate. Credit: ROBERTO SCHMIDT/AFP/Getty Images

Why has the threat of Somali piracy lessened?

Also this week on the Beeb:

Suicide at Sea – Special Maritime OB

August 25th, 2017: Live from Southampton docks in southern England on the rising rates of mental health issues and suicides amongst people working at sea.

Barrow-in-Furness: SS Arctic Penguin by Paul Wood – Built by the Dublin Drydock Company in 1910 as a lightship, the vessel served first [until 1920] on the Daunt Rock Station off the south coast of Ireland. In 2015 The Viscount Christopher Wright of Warmingham, Cheshire, bought the vessel with the intention of carrying out a full restoration and to sail her around the coast of Great Britain, presumably as a training ship for youngsters. In March 2017, the Penguin sailed off under her own steam after a 1.5 million refurbishment. more

NHA TRANG 1966 – ROK Supply Ship Buk Han – Photo by Robert Swanson (original 1600×1087)

Le port de Saigon 1920-1929 – original 2100 x1389

Junk travelling towards Hong Kong Island; photo by Gary Radler (original 4747 x 2920)

shipsandseasworldwide – 20th August 2017 – The last of ACL’s 5 new G4 ConRo vessels ‘Atlantic Sun’ finally makes her maiden call to the Royal Seaforth Container Terminal. This shot was taken from the gantry of one of the Liverpool 2’s massive new five ‘megamax’ quayside cranes –sent to us by @mark_holt_photography

The Christophe de Margerie carried a cargo of liquefied natural gas from Hammerfest in Norway to Boryeong in South Korea in 22 days.

Russian tanker sails through Arctic without icebreaker for first time

The $300m Christophe de Margerie carried a cargo of liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Hammerfest in Norway to Boryeong in South Korea in 19 days, about 30% quicker than the conventional southern shipping route through the Suez Canal.
On its maiden voyage, the innovative tanker used its integral icebreaker to cross ice fields 1.2m thick, passing along the northern sea section of the route in the Russian Arctic in a record six-and-a-half days.

8th February 1941: The crew of a British naval trawler relax in the ship’s mess room, some eating lunch, some reading in their bunks. The trawlers go out on daily patrols to sweep mines, hunt down German U-boats and guard the convoys bringing supplies to Britain during World War II. (Photo by Arthur Tanner/Fox Photos/Getty Images)

Archaeologists Are Recreating Recipes from 17th-Century Ships

If ships’ logs and sailors’ diaries are to be believed, the gastronomic situation during early voyages across the Atlantic was dire. “Lady Sea will not tolerate nor conserve meat or fish that is not dressed in her salt,” wrote Spanish explorer Eugenio de Salazar in his complaint-filled 1573 letter that’s now dubbed “The Landlubber’s Lament.”
He described wooden plates “filled with stringy beef joints, dressed with some partly cooked tendons… so rotten and stinking that you’d be better off losing your sense of taste and smell just to get it all down.”
A group of archaeologists in Texas has just begun an unusual experiment to faithfully recreate the menu onboard a typical transatlantic sailing ship. keep reading

Battleship Potemkin — Rotten Meat Movie Clip – Gnarly details as Gilyarovsky (Grigori Aleksandrov) and the doctor deny the complaints of Vakulinchuk (Aleksandr Antonov) and the crew about the meat, in Sergei Eisenstein’s Battleship Potemkin, 1925

USS Sable (IX-81) – a training ship of the United States Navy during World War II. Originally built to be a sidewheel excursion steamer (passenger ship) Greater Buffalo, she was purchased by the Navy in 1942 then converted to a freshwater training aircraft carrier to be used on the Great Lakes.
Lacking a hangar deck, elevators or armaments, she was not a true warship. The main purpose of her creation was for the advanced training of naval aviators in aircraft carrier takeoffs and landings. USS Sable (IX-81) underway on Lake Michigan (USA) in 1944-45 – full size

ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES commissioned a staggering 151 aircraft carriers during World War Two, it’s safe to say that none were as strange as the USS Wolverine and her sister ship the USS Sable. Together, Sable and Wolverine trained 17,820 pilots in 116,000 carrier landings.

A view of the steamship Seeandbee before it was converted to the USS Wolverine (IX 64). National Naval Aviation Museum photo by way of Defense Media Network

Not only were the two flattops the only American wartime carriers powered by coal (most naval vessels of the era ran on fuel oil), both served their entire military careers on Lake Michigan – more than 2,000 miles from the Pacific!

Fresh-Water Flattops: The US Navy’s Forgotten Great Lakes Aircraft Carriers

USRC Manning was a revenue cutter of the United States Revenue Cutter Service that served from 1898 to 1930, and saw service in the U.S. Navy in the Spanish–American War and World War I. Designed as a cruising cutter for Bering Sea service, Manning was built by Atlantic Works, East Boston, Massachusetts. She commissioned on 8 January 1898 and was assigned cruising grounds along the New England coast.
Manning received orders to report to the Coast Guard Depot at Curtis Bay, Maryland 26 January 1917 and departed soon thereafter. Manning sailed for Europe on 29 August 1917 with an increased wartime complement of eight officers, four warrant officers, and 96 enlisted sailors.

Algonquin, Manning, Ossipee, Seneca, Tampa and Yamacraw. One hundred years ago, these were the six Coast Guard cutters selected for overseas ocean escort convoy duty during the United States’ participation in WWI. With the U.S. declaring war on Imperial Germany on April 6, 1917, the Coast Guard was assigned to the jurisdiction of the U.S. Navy for the duration of the war. Chosen for their long-range cruising capabilities and larger size, these cruising cutters were instructed to report to various east coast naval shipyards in New York, Boston, Virginia, and Charleston, South Carolina. After being rearmed and refitted for overseas service, they sailed for the British naval port of Gibraltar.

The Long Blue Line: Coast Guard Cutters and WWI Convoys

Naval Monument, Plymouth Hoe, UK – more on wikipedia

Maritime Monday Archive s

A King’s Orders To The U.S. Navy

The mark of a great shiphandler is never getting into situations that require great shiphandling. Admiral Ernest King, USN

by Captain John Konrad (gCaptain) Could a simple bit of advice from a Naval hero prevent collisions at sea among both military and civilian ships?

In our attempt to understand the USS Fitzgerald and USS John S. McCainincidents gCaptain has reached out to maritime pilots with experience navigating US Navy ships because they speak our language, have the highest levels of professional experience and have finely honed observational skills. Pilots also have lots of experience watching crews perform during the most stressful high traffic situations. They are true experts and masters of simple, direct communication.

Mission Command- The Who, What, Where, When and Why An Anthology by Donald Vandergriff — Related Book: *Mission Command- The Who, What, Where, When and Why An Anthology* by Donald Vandergriff

In the wake of the USS John S. McCain incident. “Every Captain in the whole military industrial complex received multiple emails demanding better ship handling from every officer.” said one pilot.” The USNS xxx’s Master said he got over 20 of them… forwarded and cc’d around the globe, covering everyone’s butt.” Another pilot said “I’ve seen these emails. Some are broad but many contain detailed lists of actions that should be taken by crews. None contain anything that will prevent the next collision at sea.”

Most mariners will shake their heads in disgust at this C.Y.A. mentality but few will flag them as dangerous. Which they most certainly are.

In the short term, C.Y.A. messages send the clear message that mistakes will not be tolerated. The authors of these emails often believe they are doing good by keeping the men on their toes and focused on the problems at hand. They are partly correct, C.Y.A. messages do narrow a crew’s focus. These signals focus the mind on problems – not solutions – they also induce stress and fear and repress original thought. A watchstander needs to approach heavy traffic with plenty of rest, a clear mind and the ability to engage the problems ahead intuitively… not worried about his career and the possibility of being hit by another ship.

“When does a leader need to back off and when does a leader need to get into fine-granularity leadership?” asks CDR Salamander in an article for the US Naval Institute. “The more senior a leader gets the more he must ask himself what is a constructive level of detail? This time around this habit gained steam with ‘Intrusive Leadership’ and the belief in that if we have a long enough shafted screwdriver with a finely engineered head, then by-golly we can get things right!”

Intrusive leadership becomes especially dangerous when dictated by leaders who lack training and experience at the helm of a ship. The Secretary of the Navy is a USMC Aviator. Chief Of Naval Operations, Adm. John Richardson, is a submarine commander. Vice Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Bill Moran, is an aviator. Adm. Scott Swift, the commander of the Navy’s Pacific Fleet and the man selected to fix the problems, is an aviator.

In the wake of the USS Fitzgerald incident the small handful of senior U.S. Navy leaders with shipboard experience, like Adm. Michelle Howard, were not dispatched to Japan – where her indomitable leadership might have found solutions – but to ribbon cutting ceremonies in Europe.

What other negative consequences develop when former Naval Aviators get too far into the weeds of ship-born problems? Well, as CDR Salamander points out – when in doubt, benchmark the best. And that person is a man with significant watchstanding experience aboard ships, Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, Commander in Chief of Naval forces in WWII.

Here are Admiral King’s orders on the eve of our greatest naval battles:

“CINCLANT SERIAL (053) OF JANUARY 21, 1941 Subject: Exercise of Command — Excess of Detail in Orders and Instructions.
1. I have been concerned for many years over the increasing tendency — now grown almost to “standard practice” — of flag officers and other group commanders to issue orders and instructions in which their subordinates are told “how” as well as “what” to do to such an extent and in such detail that the “Custom of the service” has virtually become the antithesis of that essential element of command — “initiative of the subordinate.”
2. We are preparing for — and are now close to — those active operations (commonly called war) which require the exercise and the utilization of the full powers and capabilities of every officer in command status. There will be neither time nor opportunity to do more than prescribe the several tasks of the several subordinates (to say “what”, perhaps “when” and “where”, and usually, for their intelligent cooperation, “why”), leaving to them — expecting and requiring of them — the capacity to perform the assigned tasks (to do the “how”).
3. If subordinates are deprived — as they now are — of that training and experience which will enable them to act “on their own” — if they do not know, by constant practice, how to exercise “initiative of the subordinate” — if they are reluctant (afraid) to act because they are accustomed to detailed orders and instructions — if they are not habituated to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves in their several echelons of command — we shall be in sorry case when the time of “active operations” arrives.
4. The reasons for the current state of affairs — how did we get this way? — are many but among them are four which need mention: first, the “anxiety” of seniors that everything in their commands shall be conducted so correctly and go so smoothly, that none may comment unfavorably; second, those energetic activities of staffs which lead to infringement of (not to say interference with) the functions for which the lower echelons exist; third, the consequent “anxiety” of subordinates lest their exercise of initiative, even in their legitimate spheres, should result in their doing something which may prejudice their selection for promotion; fourth, the habit on the one hand and the expectation on the other of “nursing” and “being nursed” which lead respectively to the violation of command principles known as “orders to obey orders” and to that admission of incapacity or confusion evidenced by “request instructions.”
5. Let us consider certain facts: first, submarines operating submerged are constantly confronted with situations requiring the correct exercise of judgment, decision and action; second, planes, whether operating singly or in company, are even more often called upon to act correctly; third, surface ships entering or leaving port, making a landfall, steaming in thick weather, etc., can and do meet such situations while “acting singly” and, as well, the problems involved in maneuvering in formations and dispositions. Yet these same people — proven competent to do these things without benefit of “advice” from higher up — are, when grown in years and experience to be echelon commanders, all too often are not made full use of in conducting the affairs (administrative and operative) of the several echelons — echelons which exist for the purpose of facilitating command.
6. It is essential to extend the knowledge and the practice of “initiative of the subordinate” in principle and in application until they are universal in the exercise of command throughout all the echelons of command. Henceforth, we must all see to it that full use is made of the echelons of command — whether administrative (type) or operative (task) — by habitually framing orders and instructions to echelon commanders so as to tell them ‘what to do’ but not ‘how to do it’ unless the particular circumstances demand.
7. The corollaries of paragraph 6 are:
(a) adopt the premise that the echelon commanders are competent in their several command echelons unless and until they themselves prove otherwise;
(b) teach them that they are not only expected to be competent for their several command echelons but that it is required of them that they be competent;
(c) train them — by guidance and supervision — to exercise foresight, to think, to judge, to decide and to act for themselves;
(d) stop ‘nursing’ them;
(e) finally, train ourselves to be satisfied with ‘acceptable solutions’ even though they are not “staff solutions or other particular solutions that we ourselves prefer.”

The message is clear. If the US Navy wants to repair the damage it has done by closing it sSurface Warfare School, scaling back ship simulator training, pushing crews to do more with less, and allowing Aviators and Administrators to manipulate policy for vessel operations… then it needs to put someone with ship driving experience in charge, someone with the rank and authority to make sweeping change. That person needs a mandate to listen to, empower and advocate for the men standing by the helm of our Navy AND Merchant shipswithout bureaucratic and budgetary entanglements. That person is Admiral Davidson and we hope he has the support of his peers.

And those shoreside leaders of commercial ships might also benefit from reading Admiral King’s words before they send the next email out to their fleet or bolt another chapter atop their company’s SMS policy.

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